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Abstract
Two-player games on graphs are widely studied in formal methods as they model the interaction between
a system and its environment. The game is played by moving a token throughout a graph to produce an
infinite path. There are several common modes to determine how the players move the token through the
graph; e.g., in turn-based games the players alternate turns in moving the token. We study the bidding
mode of moving the token, which, to the best of our knowledge, has never been studied in infinite-duration
games. Both players have separate budgets, which sum up to 1. In each turn, a bidding takes place. Both
players submit bids simultaneously, and a bid is legal if it does not exceed the available budget. The winner
of the bidding pays his bid to the other player and moves the token. For reachability objectives, repeated
bidding games have been studied and are called Richman games [37, 36]. There, a central question is the
existence and computation of threshold budgets; namely, a value t ∈ [0, 1] such that if Player 1’s budget
exceeds t, he can win the game, and if Player 2’s budget exceeds 1− t, he can win the game. We focus on
parity games and mean-payoff games. We show the existence of threshold budgets in these games, and
reduce the problem of finding them to Richman games. We also determine the strategy-complexity of an
optimal strategy. Our most interesting result shows that memoryless strategies suffice for mean-payoff
bidding games.
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1 Introduction
Two-player infinite-duration games on graphs are an important class of games as they model the
interaction of a system and its environment. Questions about automatic synthesis of a reactive system
from its specification [41] are reduced to finding a winning strategy for the “system” player in a two-
player game. The game is played by placing a token on a vertex in the graph and allowing the
players to move it throughout the graph, thus producing an infinite trace. The winner or value of the
game is determined according to the trace. There are several common modes to determine how the
players move the token that are used to model different types of systems (c.f., [4]). The most well-
studied mode is turn-based, where the vertices are partitioned between the players and the player
who controls the vertex on which the token is placed, moves it. Other modes include probabilistic
and concurrent moves.
We study a different mode of moving, which we refer to as bidding, and to the best of our
knowledge, has never been studied for infinite-duration games. Both players have budgets, where
for convenience, we have B1 + B2 = 1. In each turn a bidding takes place for the right to move
the token. The players submit bids simultaneously, where a bid is legal if it does not exceed the
available budget. Thus, a bid is a real number in [0, Bi], for i ∈ {1, 2}. The player who bids higher
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pays the other player, and decides where the token moves. Draws can occur and one needs to devise
a mechanism for resolving them (e.g., giving advantage to Player 1), and our results do not depend
on a specific mechanism.
Bidding arises in many settings and we list several examples below. The players in a two-
player game often model concurrent processes. Bidding for moving can model an interaction with
a scheduler. The process that wins the bidding gets scheduled and proceeds with its computation.
Thus, moving has a cost and processes are interested in moving only when it is critical. When and
how much to bid can be seen as quantifying the resources that are needed for a system to achieve
its objective, which is an interesting question. Other takes on this problem include reasoning about
which input signals need to be read by the system at its different states [20, 2] as well as allowing
the system to read chunks of input signals before producing an output signal [28, 27, 33]. Also, our
bidding game can model scrip systems that use internal currencies for bidding in order to prevent
“free riding” [31]. Such systems are successfully used in various settings such as databases [44],
group decision making [43], resource allocation, and peer-to-peer networks (see [29] and references
therein). Finally, repeated bidding is a form of a sequential auction [38], which is used in many
settings including online advertising.
Recall that the winner or value of the game is determined according to the outcome, which
is an infinite trace. There are several well-studied objectives in games. The simplest objective is
reachability, where Player 1 has a target vertex and a trace is winning for him iff it visits the target.
Bidding reachability games are equivalent to Richman games [37, 36], named after David Richman.
Richman games are the first to study the bidding mode of moving. The central question that is
studied on Richman games regards a threshold budget, which is a function THRESH : V → [0, 1]
such that if Player 1’s budget exceeds THRESH(v) at a vertex v, then he has a strategy to win the
game. On the other hand, if Player 2’s budget exceeds 1− THRESH(v), he can win the game (recall
that the budgets add up to 1). In [37, 36], the authors show that threshold budgets exist, are unique,
and that finding them is in NP. We slightly improve their result by showing that the problem is in NP
and coNP. We illustrate the bidding model and the threshold problem in the following example.
I Example 1. Consider for example, the bidding reachability game that is depicted in Figure 1.
Player 1’s goal is to reach t, and Player 2’s goal is to prevent this from happening. How much budget
suffices for Player 1 to guarantee winning? Clearly, even if Player 1 has all the budget, he cannot
win in v1, thus THRESH(v1) = 1. Similarly, even if Player 2 has all the budget in t, Player 1 has
already won, thus THRESH(t) = 0. We start with a naive solution by showing that Player 1 can
win if his budget exceeds 0.75. We show a naive solution in which Player 1 wins when his budget
exceeds 0.75. Indeed, if Player 1’s budget is 0.75 + , for  > 0, then since the budgets add up to
1, Player 2’s budget is 0.25− . In the first turn, Player 1 bids 0.25 + 2 and wins the bidding since
Player 2 cannot bid above 0.25. He pays his bid to Player 2 and moves the token to v2. Thus, at the
end of the round, the budgets are 0.5 + 2 and 0.5− 2 and the token is on v2. In the second bidding,
Player 1 bids all his budget, wins the bidding since Player 2 cannot bid above 0.5, moves the token
to t, and wins the game.
However, the threshold budgets are lower. We start with v1 and t. Clearly, even if Player 1 has
all the budget, he cannot win in v1, thus THRESH(v1) = 1. Similarly, even if Player 2 has all the
budget in t, Player 1 has already won, thus THRESH(t) = 0. We show that THRESH(v0) = 2/3,
and THRESH(v2) = 1/3. Suppose Player 1’s budget at v1 is 2/3 + . Player 2’s budget is thus
1/3 − . Player 1’s bid in the first bidding is 1/3 + 0.25 and he wins since Player 2 cannot bid
beyond 1/3. Player 1 moves the token to v2. The budgets before the second bidding are 1/3+0.75
and 2/3 − 0.75 for Players 1 and 2, respectively. Now, Player 1 bids 1/3 + 0.5. If he wins, he
proceeds to t and wins the game. Otherwise, Player 2 wins the bidding, moves the token back to v0,
and pays Player 1 a sum of at least 1/3+ 0.5. Thus, Player 1’s budget before the third bidding is at
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least 2/3 + 1.25. In other words, we are back to v0 with a higher budget. By continuing like this,
Player 1’s budget increases by at least 0.25 whenever the game returns to v0, thus eventually his
budget exceeds 0.75 and he draws the game to t as in the naive solution above. A similar argument
shows that Player 1 wins with a budget of 1/3 +  in v2, and showing that Player 2 wins from v1
with 1/3 +  and from v2 with 2/3 + , is dual. J
We introduce and study infinite duration bidding games with richer qualitative objectives as well
as quantitative objectives. Parity games are an important class of qualitative games as the problem
of reactive synthesis from LTL specifications is reduced to a parity game. The vertices in a parity
game are labeled by an index in {0, . . . , d}, for some d ∈ N, and an infinite trace is winning for
Player 1 iff the parity of the maximal index that is visited infinitely often is odd. The quantitative
games we focus on are mean-payoff games. An infinite outcome has a value, which can be thought
of as the amount of money that Player 1 pays Player 2. Accordingly, we refer to the players in a
mean-payoff game as Maximizer (Max, for short) and Minimizer (Min, for short). The vertices of a
mean-payoff game are labeled by values in Z. Consider an infinite trace pi. The energy of a prefix
pin of length n of pi, denoted E(pin), is the sum of the values it traverses. The mean-payoff value
of pi is lim infn→∞E(pin)/n. We are interested in cases where Min can guarantee a non-positive
mean-payoff value. It suffices to show that he can guarantee that an infinite outcome pi either has
infinitely many prefixes with E(pin) = 0, or that the energy is bounded, thus there is N ∈ N such
that for every n ∈ N, we haveE(pin) ≤ N . We stress the point that there are two “currencies” in the
game: a “monopoly money” that is used to determine who moves the token and which the players
do not care about once the game ends, and the values on the vertices, which is the value that Min
and Max seek to minimize and maximize, respectively. We illustrate mean-payoff games with the
following example.
v0 v2 tv1 1 −1
Figure 1 On the left, a bidding reachability game. On the right, a bidding mean-payoff game where the
weights are depicted on the edges.
I Example 2. Consider the mean-payoff bidding game that is depicted in Figure 1, where for
convenience the values are placed on the edges and not on the vertices. We claim that Min has a
strategy that guarantees a non-positive mean-payoff value. Without loss of generality, Max always
chooses the 1-valued edge. Min’s strategy is a tit-for-tat-like strategy, and he always takes the (−1)-
valued edge. The difficulty is in finidng the right bids. Initially, Min bids 0. Assume Max wins a
bidding with b > 0. Min will try and match this win: he bids b until he wins with it. Let b1, . . . , bn
be Max’s winning bids before Min wins with b. We call these un-matched bids. The next bid Min
attempts to match is b′ = min1≤i≤n bi; he bids b′ until he wins with it, and continues similarly until
all bids are matched.
We claim that the tit-for-tat strategy guarantees a non-positive mean-payoff value. Observe first
that if a prefix of the outcome has k unmatched bids, then the energy is k. In particular, if all bids
are matched, the energy is 0. Suppose Min bids b. We claim that the number of un-matched bids is
at most d1/be. Otherwise, since b is less than all other un-matched bids, Max would need to invest
more than a budget of 1. It follows that an infinite outcome that never reaches energy level 0 has
bounded energy, thus the mean-payoff value is non-positive. J
We study the existence and computation of threshold budgets in parity and mean-payoff bidding
games. Also, we determine the strategy complexity that is necessary for winning. Recall that a
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winning strategy in a game typically corresponds to an implementation of a system. A strategy that
uses an unbounded memory, like the tit-for-tat strategy above, is not useful for implementing. Thus,
our goal is to find strategies that use little or no memory, which are known as memoryless strategies.
We show that parity bidding games are linearly-reducible to Richman games allowing us to ob-
tain all the positive results from these games; threshold budgets exist, are unique, and computing
them is no harder than for Richman games, i.e., the problem is in NP and coNP. We find this res-
ult quite surprising since for most other modes of moving, parity games are considerably harder
than reachability games. The crux of the proof considers bottom strongly-connected components
(BSCCs, for short) in the arena, i.e., SCCs with no exiting edges. We show that in a strongly
connected bidding parity game, exactly one of the players wins with every initial budget, thus the
threshold budgets of the vertices of a BSCC are in {0, 1}. If the vertex with highest parity in a BSCC
is odd, then Player 1 wins, i.e., the threshold budgets are all 0, and otherwise Player 2 wins, i.e., the
threshold budgets are all 1. We can thus construct a Richman game by setting the target of Player 1
to the BSCCs that are winning for him and the target of Player 2 to the ones that are winning for him.
Moreover, we show that memoryless strategies are sufficient for winning in these games. Finally,
motivated by the need to find systems of high quality, we ask whether Player 1 can not only win, but
win in a prompt manner [34]. In Büchi games the goal is to visit an accepting vertex infinitely often,
prompt winning amounts to guaranteeing a visit to an accepting vertex every k steps, for some con-
stant k ∈ N. We show a negative result; under mild assumptions, Player 2 can guarantee arbitrarily
long periods with no visits to accepting vertices with any initial budget.
We proceed to study mean-payoff bidding games. We adapt the definition of threshold values;
we say that t ∈ [0, 1] is a threshold value for Min if with a budget that exceeds t, Min can guarantee a
non-positive mean-payoff value. On the other hand, if Max’s budget exceeds 1− t, he can guarantee
a positive mean-payoff value. We show that threshold values exist and are unique in mean-payoff
bidding games. The crux of the existence proof again considers the BSCCs of the game. We show
that in a strongly-connected mean-payoff bidding game, the threshold budgets are in {0, 1}, thus
again either Min “wins” or Max “wins” the game. Moreover, this classification can be determined in
NP and coNP, thus the complexity of solving bidding mean-payoff games coincides with Richman
games. Our results for strongly-connected games are obtained by developing the connection that was
observed in [37, 36] between the threshold budget and the reachability probability in a probabilistic
model on the same structure as the game. We show a connection between bidding mean-payoff
games and one-counter 2.5-player games [14, 13] to prove the classification of BSCCs. In turn, these
games are equivalent to discrete quasi-birth-death processes [24] and generalize solvency games
[11], which can be thought of as a rewarded Markov decision process with a single vertex.
The classification above is existential in nature and does not provide any insight on how a player
guarantees a mean-payoff value. Our most technically challenging results concern the constructions
strategies for Min and Max. The challenging part of the construction is reasoning about strongly-
connected bidding mean-payoff games. Consider a strongly-connected game in which Min can
guarantee a non-positive mean-payoff value. The idea of our construction is to tie between changes
in Min’s budget with changes in the energy; investing one unit of budget (with the appropriate
normalization) implies a decrease of a unit of energy, and on the other hand, an increase of a unit of
energy implies a gain of one unit of budget. Since the budgets are bounded by 1, the value cannot
increase arbitrarily. Finding the right bids in a general SCC is not trivial, and we find our solution
to be surprisingly elegant. The case where Max can guarantee a positive mean-payoff value, is more
challenging. Unlike a memoryless strategy for Min, the normalization factor must decrease as the
value increases so that Max does not exhaust his budget. We show constant memory strategies in
general and identify a fragment in which we show memoryless strategies.
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Further bidding games Variants of bidding games where studied in the past. Already in [36]
several variants are studied including a poorman version in which the winner of the bidding pays
the bank, thus the amount of money in the game decreases as the game proceeds. Motivated by
recreational games, e.g., bidding chess, discrete bidding games are studied in [23], where the money
is divided into chips, so a bid cannot be arbitrarily small as in the bidding games we study. In all-pay
bidding games [39], the players all pay their bids to the bank. Non-zero-sum two-player games were
recently studied in [30]. They consider a bidding game on a directed acyclic graph. Moving the
token throughout the graph is done by means of bidding. The game ends once the token reaches a
sink, and each sink is labeled with a pair of payoffs for the two players that do not necessarily sum up
to 0. They show existence of subgame perfect equilibrium for every initial budget and a polynomial
algorithm to compute it.
2 Preliminaries
An arena is a pair 〈G,α〉, where G is a directed graph and α is an objective. A game is played on
an arena as follows. A token is placed on a vertex in the arena and the players move it throughout
the graph. The outcome is an infinite path pi. The winner or value is determined according to pi and
α as we elaborate below. There are several common modes in which the players move the token.
In turn-based games the vertices are partitioned between the players and the player who controls
the vertex on which the token is placed, moves it. Another mode is probabilistic choices, where the
game can be thought of as a Markov chain, thus the edges are labeled with probabilities, and the edge
on which the token proceeds is chosen randomly. A combination of these two modes is called 2.5-
player games, where the vertices are partitioned into three sets: Player 1 vertices, Player 2 vertices,
and probabilistic vertices. Finally, in concurrent games, each player has a possible (typically finite)
set of actions he can choose from in a vertex. The players select an action simultaneously, and the
choice of actions dictates to which vertex the token moves.
We study a different mode of moving, which we call bidding. Both players have budgets, where
for convenience, we have B1+B2 = 1. In each turn, a bidding takes place to determine who moves
the token. Both players submit bids simultaneously, where a bid is a real number in [0, Bi], for
i ∈ {1, 2}. The player who bids higher pays the other player and decides where the token moves.
Note that the sum of budgets always remains 1. While draws can occur, in the questions we study
we try avoid the issue of draws.
A strategy prescribes to a player which action to take in a game, given a finite history of the game,
where we define these two notions below. In 2.5-player games, histories are paths and actions are
vertices. Thus, a strategy for Player i, for i ∈ {1, 2}, takes a finite path that ends in a Player i vertex,
and prescribes to which vertex the token moves to next. In bidding games, histories and strategies are
more complicated as they maintain the information about the bids and winners of the bids. A history
is a sequence of the form v0, 〈v1, b1, i1〉, 〈v2, b2, i2〉, . . . , 〈vk, bk, ik〉 ∈ V · (V × [0, 1] × {1, 2})∗,
where, for j ≥ 1, in the j-th round, the token is placed on vertex vj−1, the winning bid is bj , and
the winner is Player ij , and Player ij moves the token to vertex vj . An action for a player is 〈b, v〉 ∈
([0, 1]× V ), where b is the bid and v is the vertex to move to upon winning. An initial vertex v0 and
strategies f1 and f2 for Players 1 and 2, respectively, determine a unique outcome pi for the game,
denoted out(v0, f1, f2), which is an infinite sequence in V · (V × [0, 1]× {1, 2})ω . We sometimes
abuse notation and refer to out(v0, f1, f2) as a finite prefix of the infinite outcome. We drop v0 when
it is clear from the context. We define the outcome inductively. The first element of the outcome
is v0. Suppose pi1, . . . , pij is defined. The players bids are given by 〈b1, v1〉 = f1(pi1, . . . , pij) and
〈b2, v2〉 = f2(pi1, . . . , pij). If b1 > b2, then pij+1 = 〈v1, b1, 1〉, and dually when b1 < b2, we
have pij+1 = 〈v2, b2, 2〉. We assume there is some tie-breaking mechanism that determines who the
winner is when b1 = b2, and our results are not affected by what the tie-breaking mechanism is.
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Consider a finite outcome pi. The payment of Player 1 in pi, denoted B1(pi), is
∑
1≤j≤|pi|(−1)3−ij bj ,
and Player 2’s payment, denoted B2(pi) is defined similarly. For i ∈ {1, 2}, consider an initial
budget Biniti ∈ [0, 1] for Player i. A strategy f is legal for Player i with respect to Biniti if for every
v0 ∈ V and strategy g for the other player, Player i’s bid in a finite outcome pi = out(v0, f, g) does
not surpass his budget. Thus, for 〈b, v〉 = f(pi), we have b ≤ Biniti − Bi(pi).
Richman games and threshold budgets The simplest qualitative objective is reachability: Player 1
has a target vertex vR and an infinite outcome is winning for him if it visits vR. Reachability bidding
games are known as Richman games [37, 36]. In Richman games both players have a target, which
we denote by vR and vS . The game ends once one of the targets is reached. Note that this definition
is slightly different from standard reachability games since there, Player 2 has no target and his goal
is to keep the game from vR. Though, we show that for our purposes, since Richman games have no
ties, reachability games are equivalent to Richman games (see Lemma 4).
The central question that is studied on bidding games regards a threshold budget. A threshold
budget is a function THRESH : V → [0, 1] such that if Player 1’s budget exceeds THRESH(v) at a
vertex v, then he has a strategy to win the game. On the other hand, if Player 2’s budget exceeds
1− THRESH(v), he can win the game. We sometimes use THRESH1(v) to refer to THRESH(v) and
THRESH2(v) to refer to 1− THRESH(v). We formalize the problem of finding threshold budgets as
a decision problem. We define the THRESH-BUDG problem, which takes as input a bidding game
G, a vertex v, and a value t ∈ [0, 1], and the goal is to decide whether THRESH(v) = t.
Threshold values are shown to exist in [37] as well as how to compute them. We review briefly
their results. Consider a Richman game G = 〈V,E, vR, vS〉. We define the Richman function as
follows. We first define R(v, i), for i ∈ N ∪ {0}, where the intuition is that if Player 1’s budget
exceeds R(v, i), he can win in at most i steps. We define R(vR, 0) = 0 and R(v, 0) = 1 for
every other vertex v ∈ V . Indeed, Player 1 can win in 0 steps from vR no matter what his initial
budget is, and even if he has all the budget, he cannot win in 0 steps from anywhere else. Consider
i ∈ N and v ∈ V . We denote by adj(v) ⊆ V , the adjacent vertices to v, so u ∈ adj(v) iff
E(v, u). Let v+ be the vertex that maximizes the expression maxu∈adj(v)R(u, i − 1), and let
v− be the vertex that minimizes the expression minu∈adj(v)R(u, i − 1). We define R(v, i) =
1
2
(
R(v+, i− 1)+R(v−, i− 1)). We define R(v) = limi→∞R(v, i). The following theorem shows
that R(v) equals THRESH(v), and throughout the paper we use them interchangeably. We give the
proof of the theorem for completeness.
I Theorem 3. [37] For every v ∈ V , we have THRESH(v) = R(v), thus if Player 1’s budget at v
exceeds R(v), he can win from v, and if Player 2’s budget exceeds 1−R(v), he can win from v.
Proof. We prove for Player 1 and the proof for Player 2 is dual. Let t ∈ N be an index such
that Binit1 > R(v, t). We prove by induction on t that Player 1 wins in at most t steps. The
base case is easy. For the inductive step, assume Player 1 has a budget of R(v, i) + . He bids
b1 = 12
(
R(v+, i − 1) − R(v−, i − 1)). If he wins the bidding, he proceeds to v− with a budget of
R(v−, i− 1) + . If he loses, then Player 2’s bid exceeds b1 and the worst he can do is move to v+.
But then Player 1’s budget is at least R(v+, i − 1) + . By the induction hypothesis, Player 1 wins
in at most i− 1 steps from both positions. J
We make precise the equivalence between reachability and Richman games.
I Lemma 4. Consider a bidding reachability game G = 〈V,E, T 〉, where T ⊆ V is a target set
of vertices for Player 1. Let S ⊆ V be the vertices with no path to T . Consider the Richman game
G′ = 〈V ∪{vR, vS}, E′, vR, vS〉, where E′ = E∪{〈v, vR〉 : v ∈ T}∪{〈v, vS〉 : v ∈ S}. For every
v ∈ V , the threshold budget of v in G equals the threshold budget of v in G′.
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Finding threshold budgets The authors in [36] study the complexity of threshold-budget problem
and show that is in NP. They guess, for each vertex v its neighbors v− and v+, and devise a linear
program with the constraints R(v) = 12
(
R(v−) + R(v+)
)
and, for every neighbor v′ of v, we have
R(v−) ≤ R(v′) ≤ R(v+). The program has a solution iff the guess is correct. They leave open the
problem of determining the exact complexity of finding the threshold budgets, and they explicitly
state that it is not known whether the problem is in P or NP-hard.
We improve on their result by showing that THRESH-BUDG is in NP and coNP. Our reduction
uses an important observation that is made in [37], which will be useful later on. They connect
between threshold budgets and reachability probabilities in Markov chains.
I Observation 5. Consider a Richman game G = 〈V,E, vR, vS〉. Let M(G) be a Markov chain
in which for each vertex v ∈ V , the probability of the edges 〈v, v+〉 and 〈v, v−〉 is 12 and the other
outgoing edges from v have probability 0. Then, since R(v) = 12
(
R(v+) + R(v−)
)
, in M(G), the
probability of reaching vR from v is THRESH(v).
We reduce THRESH-BUDG to the problem of “solving” a simple stochastic game (SSG, for
short) [22]. An SSG has two players; one tries to minimize the probability that the target is reached,
and the second player tries to minimize it. It is well-known that the game has a value, which is
the probability of reaching the target when both players play optimally. The problem of finding the
value of an SSG is known to be in NP ∩ coNP. The SSG we construct can be seen as a turn-based
game in which the player whose turn it is to move is chosen uniformly at random.
I Theorem 6. THRESH-BUDG for Richman games is in NP ∩ coNP.
Proof. We reduce the problem of finding the Richman value to the problem of finding the value
in a 2.5-player reachability game, also called simple stochastic games [22] (SSGs, for short), which
is known to be in NP and coNP. Let vR be Player 1’s target vertex. Consider an SSG S and two
strategies f and g for the two players. We can construct a Markov chain from S using f and g, and
compute the probability that vR is reached when the two players follow f and g, which we denote
by Prf,g[Reach(vR)]. The value of a vertex v, denoted val(v), is supf infg Prf,g[Reach(vR)]. It is
known that val(v) is achieved by memoryless strategies for both players.
Consider a Richman game G = 〈V,E, vR, vS〉 and a vertex v ∈ V . We construct an SSG SG
by splitting every vertex v ∈ V , into a probabilistic vertex vc, a Player 1 vertex v1, and a Player 2
vertex v2. There are edges 〈vc, v1〉 and 〈vc, v2〉 with probability 1/2 each, which correspond to
choosing randomly the player that moves next. From vi, for i ∈ {1, 2}, there are edges to a vertex
uc iff 〈v, u〉 is an edge in G. We claim that val(vc) = R(v). We show that val(vc) ≥ R(v),
and the other direction is dual. Consider a vertex v ∈ V . Let f be the memoryless Player 1
strategy in SG that proceeds from v1 to v−c . Consider a memoryless strategy g for Player 2. We
have val(v) ≥ Prf,g[Reach(vR)]. For a vertex u ∈ V in the Richman game, let Rg be a function
that satisfies Rg(vR) = 0, Rg(vS) = 1, and for every other vertex u ∈ V , we have Rg(u) =
1
2
(
Rg(u−)+Rg(g(u))
)
. It is not hard to see that 1−Rg(v) = Prf,g[Reach(vR)] andRg(v) ≤ R(v),
thus the claim follows, and we are done. J
We stress the fact that the strategies in SSGs are very different from bidding games. As men-
tioned above, there, the strategies only prescribe which vertex to move the token to, whereas in
bidding games, a strategy also prescribes what the next bid should be. So, a solution of a Richman
game by reducing it to an SSG is existential in nature and does not give insight on the bids a player
uses in his winning strategy. We will return to this point later on.
Objectives We study zero-sum games. The qualitative games we focus on are parity games. A
parity game is a triple 〈V,E, p〉, where p : V → {0, . . . , d} is a parity function that assigns to each
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vertex a parity index. An infinite outcome is winning for Player 1 iff the maximal index that is visited
infinitely often is odd. The quantitative games we focus on are mean-payoff games. A mean-payoff
game is 〈V,E,w〉, where w : V → Z is a weight function on the vertices. We often refer to the
sum of weights in a path as its energy. Consider an infinite outcome pi = v0, 〈v1, b1, i1〉, . . .. For
n ≥ 0, we use pin to refer to the prefix of length n of pi. The energy of pin, denoted E(pin), is∑
0≤i≤n−1 w(vi). We define the mean-payoff value of pi to be lim infn→∞
E(pin)
n . The value of pi
can be thought of as the amount of money Player 1 pays Player 2. Note that the mean-payoff values
do not affect the budgets of the players. That is, the game has two currencies: a “monopoly money”
that is used to determine who moves the token and which the players do not care about once the
game ends, and the mean-payoff value that is determined according to the weights of the vertices,
which is the value that Min and Max seek to minimize and maximize, respectively. Consider a finite
outcome pi. We use Bm(pi) and BM (pi) to denote the sum of payments of Min and Max in the bids.
Throughout the paper we use m and M to refer to Min and Max, respectively.
Strategy complexity Recall that a winning strategy in a two-player game often corresponds to a
system implementation. Thus, we often search for strategies that use limited or no memory. That is,
we ask whether a player can win even with a memoryless strategy, which is a strategy in which the
action depends only on the position of the game and not on the history. For example, in turn-based
games, for i ∈ {1, 2}, a memoryless strategy for Player i prescribes, for each vertex v ∈ Vi, a
successor vertex u. It is well known that memoryless strategies are sufficient for winning in a wide
variety of games, including turn-based parity games and turn-based mean-payoff games. In Richman
games, the threshold budgets tell us who the winner of the game is. But, they do not give insight
on how the game is won game, namely what are the bids the winning player bids in order to win.
Particularly, when the threshold budgets are 0 as we shall see in Lemmas 7 and 15.
We extend the definition of memoryless strategies to bidding games, though the right definition
is not immediate. One can define a memoryless strategy as a function from vertex and budget to
action (i.e., bid and vertex) similar to the definition in other games. However, this definition does
not preserve the philosophy of implementation with no additional memory. Indeed, recall the proof
of Theorem 3. One can define a strategy that, given a vertex v ∈ V and a budget B, bids according
to Rt(v), where t is the minimal index such that Rt(v) < B. Clearly, the memory that is needed to
implement such a strategy is infinite.
To overcome this issue, we use a different definition. We define a memoryless strategy in a vertex
v ∈ V with initial budget B ∈ [0, 1] as a pair 〈u, fBv 〉, where u ∈ adj(v) is the vertex to proceed to
upon winning and fBv : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is a function that takes the current budget and, in mean-payoff
games, also the energy, and returns a bid. We require that fBv is simple, namely a polynomial or
a selection between a constant number of polynomials. For simplicity, we assume a memoryless
strategy is generated for an initial vertex with an initial budget, thus there can be different strategies
depending where the game starts and with what budget. Also, we call a concatenation of memoryless
strategies, a memoryless strategy.
3 Parity Bidding Games
We study threshold budgets in bidding parity games. We first study strongly-connected parity games
and show a classification for them; either Player 1 wins with every initial budget or Player 2 wins
with every initial budget.
I Lemma 7. Consider a strongly-connected parity game G = 〈V,E, p〉. There exists τ ∈ {0, 1}
such that for every v ∈ V , we have R(v) = τ . Moreover, we have τ = 0 iff maxv∈V p(v) is odd.
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Proof. The proof relies on the following claim: Player 1 wins a Richman game in which only
his target is reachable, with every initial budget. The claim clearly implies the lemma as we view a
strongly-connected bidding parity game as a Richman game in which Player 1 tries to force the game
to the vertex with the highest parity index, and Player 2 has no target, thus Player 1 wins with every
initial budget. The claim is similar for Player 2. The proof of the claim follows from the fact that
the threshold budget of a vertex v ∈ V is some average between THRESH(vR) and THRESH(vS),
and the average depends on the distances of v to the two targets. When only Player 1’s target is
reachable, we have THRESH(v) = 0.
We prove the claim for an odd maximal parity index, and the proof is similar for even maximal
parity index. We claim that from every vertex v ∈ S, if Player 1 has a positive budget, he can force
the game to reach the vertex u ∈ S with maximal parity index. Moreover, he can force the game to
reach u with positive budget. A special vertex in S is u. Trivially, Player 1 can reach u, but we show
that he can also reach u with positive budget in a non-trivial path, i.e., a loop.
We construct a Richman game on a graph 〈V |S ∪ {t}, E′〉, where t is a new vertex, and we
redirect edges that have u as a target to the vertex t, thus for every e = 〈v, w〉 ∈ E|S , if w 6= u,
then e ∈ E′ and otherwise 〈v, t〉 ∈ E′. Player 1’s objective is t and Player 2 has no objective
(alternatively, his objective cannot be reached). We claim that R(v) = 0, for every v ∈ S. Assume
towards contradiction that this is not the case. Let v be a vertex with maximal R(v) in S, and we
denote γ = R(v). In particular, we have γ > 0. Since S is strongly connected, there is a path pi from
v to u. Let w be the last vertex on pi before t. Since R(w−) = R(t) = 0 and R(w+) ≤ γ, we have
R(w) < γ. Let w′ be the vertex before w in pi. We have R(w′+) ≤ γ and R(w′−) ≤ R(w) < γ,
thus R(w′) < γ. Continuing inductively we get R(v) < γ, which is a contradiction.
Consider a vertex v ∈ S and assume Player 1’s budget is 1 > 0. We describe a winning strategy
for Player 1. By the above, R(v) = 0. Thus, there is a number i1 ∈ N such that R(v, i1) < 1. By
Theorem 3, Player 1 has a strategy that forces the game to u. Furthermore, the winning strategy that
is described there guarantees that u is reached with a positive budget. Let that budget be 2 > 0.
Again, there is an index i2 such that R(u, i2) < 2. We continue ad infinitum thereby guaranteeing
that u is visited infinitely often. Since u has maximal parity index in S and it is odd, Player 1 wins
the game. J
Consider a bidding parity game G = 〈V,E, p〉. Let R and S be the set of vertices in the BSCCs
that are winning for Player 1 and Player 2, respectively. Let G′ be the Richman game that is obtained
from G by setting the target of Player 1 to be the vertices in R and the target of Player 2 to be the
vertices in S. The following lemma follows from Lemma 7.
I Lemma 8. For every v ∈ V , we have that THRESH(v) in G equals THRESH(v) in G′.
Lemma 8 allows us to obtain the positive results of Richman games in parity bidding games.
I Theorem 9. The threshold budgets in parity bidding games exist, are unique, and THRESH-
BUDG is in NP ∩ coNP.
We continue to study the strategy complexity in parity games.
I Theorem 10. Consider a parity game G = 〈V,E, p〉 and a vertex v ∈ V . For i ∈ {1, 2},
Player i has a memoryless strategy that is winning if Biniti > THRESHi(v).
Proof. We show a memoryless strategy for Richman games. In order to obtain a memoryless
strategy for parity games we proceed as the above; we first find a memoryless strategy in the
Richman game in which the winning BSCCs are the targets for Player 1 and the losing BSCCs
are the targets for Player 2, and then find a memoryless strategy in the internal Richman game
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by letting Player 1 draw the game to the vertex with maximal parity index. Consider a Richman
game G = 〈V,E, vR, vS〉, a vertex v0 ∈ V , and an initial budget Binit1 ∈ [0, 1] for Player 1 with
B > R(v0). Let  = (B − R(v
+
0 )−R(v−0 )
2 ). Since R(v0) =
R(v+0 )+R(v
−
0 )
2 , we have  > 0. We trim
G by keeping only edges of the form 〈v, v−〉, for every v ∈ V . Note that every vertex v that has
R(v) < 1 has a path to vR. Let dist(v) be the distance from vR in the trimmed graph. For every
vertex v ∈ V , there is a constant in [0, 1] that is sufficient for winning dist(v) times in a row. If
Player 1’s budget exceeds this constant, he bids accordingly and draws the game to vR. Otherwise,
Player 1 bids R(v
+)+R(v−)
2 +  · 2−dist(v). Note that if Player 1 wins for dist(v) times, he wins the
game. Otherwise, he loses a bid and gains at least  · 2−|V |, thus eventually he will be able to win
|V | times in a row. J
Prompt winning
Motivated by the need to reason about the quality of systems, researchers have studied the question
of prompt satisfaction of a specification [34]. Promptness in reachability games amounts to asking
whether there is a bound k such that the target is reached by round k. Similarly, for Büchi games,
we ask whether there is a bound k such that an accepting state is visited every k rounds (rather
than the weaker property of visiting it infinitely often). We study promptness in bidding games, and
we start with reachability games. The following theorem is an immediate corollary of the proof of
Theorem 3.
I Theorem 11. Let t ∈ N be the minimal index such that BR > R(t, v), for some v ∈ V . Then,
the reachability player can guarantee reaching vR in t rounds and the safety player can keep the
game from reaching vR for t− 1 rounds.
We find our result for Büchi games somewhat surprising. Essentially, we show that the Büchi
player cannot guarantee a prompt winning for every initial budget. Formally, we have the following.
I Theorem 12. Consider a strongly-connected Büchi bidding game S = 〈V,E〉 and let F ⊆ V
be a set of accepting vertices. If S contains a cycle C that does not traverse a vertex in F , then for
every k ∈ N and every initial positive budget, Player 2 has a strategy that forces the game to cycle
C for k times without visiting v. Thus, no accepting state is reached for at least k rounds.
Proof. We consider the “k-unwinding” G of S, which is G = 〈V × {0, . . . , k}, E′〉, where we
describe E′ below. Intuitively, when the token is at level i, i.e., on a vertex in V × {i}, it means that
C was traversed for i times without a visit to v. Accordingly, the edge that closes the cycle C leads
from level i to level i + 1 and incoming edges to v lead from level i to level 0. Only Player 2 has
a target, which are the vertices on the k-th level. Indeed, the k-th level is reached iff the cycle C is
traversed k times. Since Player 2’s goal is reachable from all vertices and Player 1 has no target, by
Lemma 7, Player 2 can guarantee reaching for any positive initial budget, and we are done. J
4 Mean-Payoff Bidding Games
We proceed to study mean-payoff games. We adjust the definition of threshold budgets to the quant-
itative setting.
I Definition 13. Consider a mean-payoff bidding game G = 〈V,E,w〉. The threshold budget in a
vertex v ∈ V , denoted THRESH(v), is a value t ∈ [0, 1] such that
1. If Min’s budget exceeds t at v, then he can guarantee a non-positive mean-payoff value, and
2. if Max’s budget exceeds 1− t, then he can guarantee a strictly positive value.
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4.1 Solving Bidding Mean-Payoff Games
In this section we solve the problem of finding threshold values in bidding mean-payoff games.
Our solution relies on work on probabilistic models, namely one-counter simple stochastic games
[14, 13], and it is existential in nature. Namely, knowing what the threshold budget is in v does not
give much insight on how Min guarantees a non-negative value even if he has sufficient budget, and
similarly for Max. Constructing concrete memoryless strategies for the two players is much more
challenging and we show constructions in the following sections.
Recall that in bidding parity games, we showed a classification for strongly-connected games;
namely, the threshold budgets in all vertices are in {0, 1}, thus either Player 1 wins with every initial
budget or Player 2 wins with every initial budget. We show a similar classification for strongly-
connected bidding mean-payoff games: the threshold budgets in all vertices of a strongly-connected
bidding mean-payoff game are in {0, 1}, thus in a strongly-connected bidding mean-payoff game,
for every initial energy and every initial budget, either Min can guarantee a non-positive mean-payoff
value or Max can guarantee a positive mean-payoff value. The classification uses a generalization
of the Richman function to weighted graphs. Consider a strongly-connected bidding mean-payoff
game G = 〈V,E,w〉 and a vertex u ∈ V . We construct a graph Gu = 〈V u, Eu, wu〉 by making two
copies us and ut of u, where us has no incoming edges and ut has no outgoing edges. Thus, a path
from us to ut in Gu corresponds to a loop in G. Recall that we denote by w(v) the weight of the
vertex v.
I Definition 14. Consider a strongly-connected bidding mean-payoff game G = 〈V,E,w〉, a
vertex u ∈ V . We define the weighted Richman function W : V → Q first on Gu. We define
W (ut) = 0 and for every v ∈ (S \ {ut}), we define W (v) = 12
(
W (v+) +W (v−)
)
+ w(v). In
order to define W on G, we define W (u) to be W (us) in Gu.
We use the connection with probabilistic models as in Observation 5 in order to show that W is well
defined. We view Gu as a rewarded Markov chain, in which, for v ∈ V , the outgoing edges from
v with positive probability probabilities are 〈v, v+〉 and 〈v, v−〉, and their probability is 1/2. The
function W coincides with the expected reward of a run that starts and returns to u, which in turn is
well-defined since the probability of returning to u is 1.
Similarly to the connection we show in Theorem 6 between Richman values and reachability
probabilities in a simple-stochastic game, we prove Lemma 15 by connecting the threshold value
in bidding mean-payoff games to the probability that a counter in a one-counter simple-stochastic
games reaches value 0. We then use results from [14, 13] on this model to prove the lemma.
I Lemma 15. Consider a strongly-connected bidding mean-payoff game G = 〈V,E,w〉. There is
τ ∈ {0, 1} such that for every v ∈ V , we have THRESH(v) = τ . Moreover, we have τ = 0 iff there
exists u ∈ V with W (u) ≤ 0.
Proof. Consider a strongly-connected bidding mean-payoff game G = 〈V,E,w〉. We construct
a 2.5-player game S(G) similar to the proof of Theorem 6. We split every vertex v ∈ V into
three vertices; a probability vertex vc, a Min vertex vm, and a Max vertex vM . We add edges with
probability 1/2 from vc to vm and vM , and edges with probability 1 from vm and vM to every v′c
such that 〈v, v′〉 ∈ E. The difference between the constructions is that now, the game has weights
and we define the weight of vc to be w(v). The game we construct is referred to as one-counter SSG
in [14]. There, the authors consider the objective of termination, i.e., reaching an energy level of 0.
Formally, for a vertex v ∈ V and an energy level i ∈ N, let Term(v, i) be the set of infinite paths
that start at v and have a decrease of at least i units of energy. It is shown in [14] that if there exists a
vertex u ∈ V with W (u) ≥ 0 as well as a cycle from u to itself with negative sum of weights, then
Min has a memoryless strategy f that has Prf,g[Term(v, i)] = 1, for every Max strategy g. On the
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other hand, by combining the results of [14] with [13], we have that if W (u) > 0, for all u ∈ V ,
then there exists a memoryless Max strategy g such that limn→∞ Prf,g[Term(v, n)] = 0, for every
Min strategy f .
In order to connect the threshold budget in G with the termination probability in S(G), we “un-
wind” both structures into a graph with infinite-many vertices in which we keep track of the accumu-
lated energy. We refer to the unwinding of G as G∞. Intuitively, reaching a vertex 〈v, i〉 ∈ (V ×N)
in G∞ corresponds to reaching v with energy i in G. The goal for Min is to reach energy level 0,
thus G∞ is a Richman game with infinite many vertices. The unwinding of S(G) coincides with
G∞. Since G∞ is locally finite, by [36], it has threshold budgets that satisfy the same properties as
in finite graphs. WhenW (u) ≥ 0, we show thatR(〈v, i〉) = 0, for every v ∈ V and i ∈ N, thus Min
can guarantee reaching an energy level of 0 from v with initial energy i, for every initial budget, thus
by Lemma 16 he guarantees a non-negative mean-payoff value. On the other hand, if W (u) > 0, we
can show that for every v ∈ V , we have limi→∞R(〈v, i〉) = 1, thus for an initial Max budget BM ,
there is an initial energy level n such that 1−R(〈v, n〉) < BM . So, by Lemma 16, Max guarantees
a positive mean-payoff value.
We show how to connect the Richman value of 〈v, i〉 in G∞ with the termination probability in
S(G). We prove for the case that there exists u ∈ V with W (u) ≥ 0, and the other case is similar.
First note that if there are no negative-weight cycles in G, then there are also no positive-weight
cycles, thus all outcomes have a mean-payoff value of 0. Suppose there is at least one negative-
weight cycle in G. We construct from G an (unweighted) Richman game with infinite many vertices
by keeping track of the accumulated energy throughout a play and setting Min’s goal to reach energy
level 0. We have G∞ = 〈V∞, E∞〉, where V∞ = V × N ∪ {vwin} and we describe E∞ below.
Intuitively, reaching a vertex 〈v, i〉 ∈ V∞ in G∞ corresponds to reaching v with energy i in G.
For convenience we assume the weights are on the edges rather than the vertices. Accordingly, for
i, j ≥ 0, we have 〈〈v, i〉, 〈u, j〉〉 ∈ E∞ iff e = 〈v, u〉 ∈ E andw(e) = j−i, and 〈〈v, i〉, vwin〉 ∈ E∞
iff there is a vertex u ∈ V with e = 〈v, u〉 ∈ E and i+ w(e) < 0. Note that G∞ is locally finite. It
is shown in [36] that threshold budgets exist for such infinite-graph games and that for every vertex
v ∈ V∞, there are v+, v− ∈ V∞ with R(v) = 12
(
R(v−) +R(v+)
)
.
Recall that a strategy for a player in a bidding game consists of two components; a bid and
a vertex to move to upon winning. We fix the second component for Min: we call fm a Min
strategy that, at a vertex v ∈ V , proceeds to v− ∈ V upon winning, where recall that v− is the
neighbor of v with the minimal weighted-Richman value. We define a Richman value Rfm for
G∞, where Min proceeds according to fm. Using the same proof of [36], we can show that Rfm
is defined and for every 〈v, i〉 ∈ V∞, there is 〈v′, i′〉, 〈v−, i′′〉 ∈ V∞ such that Rfm(〈v, i〉) =
1
2
(
Rfm(〈v′, i′〉+Rfm(〈v−, i′′〉)
)
). Note that R(〈v, i〉) ≤ Rfm(〈v, i〉).
Let gM be a Max strategy in S(G) that proceeds from vM with energy i ∈ N to v′c ∈ V such
that Rfm(〈v, i〉) = 12
(
Rfm(〈v′, i′〉+Rfm(〈v−, i′′〉)
)
). Note that fm can be seen as a Min strategy
in S(G). Moreover, note that Prfm,gM [Term(vp, i)] = 1 − Rfm(〈v, i〉). Indeed, for v ∈ V ,
we have Prfm,gM [Term(vc, 0)] = 1 and Prfm,gM [Term(vc, i)] = 12
(
Prfm,gM [Term(v−, i′)] +
Prfm,gM [Term(gM (v), i′′)]
)
, where i′ and i′′ are the appropriate energy levels. Since memory-
less strategies suffice in one-counter SSGs, there is a Max memoryless strategy fM for which
Prfm,gM [Term(vc, i)] ≤ Prfm,fM [Term(vc, i)].
Assume towards contradiction that Prfm,fM [Term(vc, i)] < 1. Let WfM be a function on V
that is defined similarly to W . We split u into two vertices us and ut, define WfM (ut) = 0, and, for
v ∈ V we have WfM (v) = 12
(
WfM (v−)+WfM (fM (v))
)
, where v− ∈ V is the neighbor of v that
has the minimal value according to WfM . Clearly, we have WfM (v) ≤W (v). Since W (u) ≤ 0, we
have WfM (u) ≤ 0, thus it follows from [14] that Prfm,fM [Term(vc, i)] = 1, and we are done. J
I Remark. In the following sections we show an alternative direct proof to Lemma 15 (see Theor-
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ems 22 and 33), which does not use the probabilistic connection and constructs concrete strategies
for the players. We include both proofs for Lemma 15 since we find the probabilistic connection
important.
Lemma 16, which is also helpful in the following sections, shows how to connect the mean-
payoff value with the objective of reaching energy 0 or maintaining non-negative energy.
I Lemma 16. Consider a strongly-connected bidding mean-payoff game G and a vertex u in G.
Suppose that for every initial budget and initial energy, Min has a strategy fm and there is a
constant N ∈ N such that for every Max strategy fM , a finite outcome pi = out(u, fm, fM )
either reaches energy 0 or the energy is bounded by N throughout pi. Then, Min can guarantee
a non-positive mean-payoff value in G.
If for every initial budget BinitM ∈ [0, 1] for Max there exists an initial energy level n ∈ N such
that Max can guarantee a non-negative energy level in G, then Max can guarantee a positive
mean-payoff value in G.
Proof. We start with the first claim. Suppose Min has a strategy fm as the above, and we describe a
Min strategy f ′m that guarantees a non-positive mean-payoff value. Min plays according to fm until
an energy of 0 is reached. He bids 0 until the energy increases, then he forces the game back to u,
which is possible due to Lemma 7, and plays again according to fm. Since the mean-payoff value of
an infinite outcome is the lim inf of the mean-payoff values of its finite prefixes, reaching 0 energy
infinitely often implies a non-positive mean-payoff value. On the other hand, consider an infinite
outcome pi1 · pi2 ∈ out(u, f ′m, fM ), where fM is some Max strategy and pi1 is the prefix after which
0 energy is never reached. Then, the energy level in pi2 is bounded by N . Thus, the mean-payoff
value of pi is 0, and we are done.
We proceed to the second claim. Consider an initial budget BinitM for Max. Let  = W (v) ·(
2
∑
v∈V cont(v)
)−1
and let G be the game obtained from G by decreasing all the weights by .
Then, the weighted Richman value of u in G is W (u)/2 and in particular, it is positive. Thus, there
exists n ∈ N such that Max can keep the energy level in G non-negative with an initial budget
of BinitM , if the initial energy level is n. Max plays in G according to his strategy in G. Thus, he
guarantees that for every finite outcome pi in G, the energy is at least |pi| − n. Since n is constant,
the mean-payoff value of an infinite outcome is at least . J
Deciding the classification in Lemma 15 can be done in NP and coNP by guessing the neighbors
the vertices and using linear programming, similarly to Richman games. Then, we reduce bidding
mean-payoff games to Richman games in a similar way to the proof of Lemma 8 for parity games.
I Theorem 17. Threshold budgets exist in bidding mean-payoff games, they are unique, and
THRESH-BUDG for bidding mean-payoff games is in NP ∩ coNP.
Proof. Consider a bidding mean-payoff game G = 〈V,E,w〉. Lemma 15 induces a reduction
from bidding mean-payoff games to Richman games: we classify the BSCCs of G, relate Min with
Player 1 and Max with Player 2, and set the BSCCs with threshold budget 0 as Player 1’s target
and these with threshold budget 1 as Player 2’s target. For every v ∈ V that is not in a BSCC, we
have THRESH(v) = R(v). Indeed, if Min’s budget exceeds R(v) in v, he can draw the game to a
BSCC from which he can guarantee a non-negative mean-payoff value, and the claim for a budget
below R(v) is dual. Thus, we only need to show how to determine whether a BSCC S of G has a
vertex u ∈ S with W (u) ≤ 0. This can easily be done in NP and coNP. For a vertex u ∈ S we
guess, for every v ∈ S two neighbors v+ and v−, and add the appropriate linear constraints: we
have W (ut) = 0, for every neighbor v′ of v we have W (v−) ≤ W (v′) ≤ W (v+) and W (v) =
1
2
(
W (v−)+W (v+)
)
+w(v). Such a system can be solved in polynomial time, thus we are done. J
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4.2 A Memoryless Optimal Strategy for Min
We turn to the more challenging task of finding memoryless strategies for the players, and in this
section we focus on constructing a strategy for Min. Theorem 10 and Lemma 15 allow us to focus
on strongly-connected bidding mean-payoff games. Consider a strongly-connected bidding mean-
payoff game G = 〈V,E,w〉 that has a vertex u ∈ V with W (u) ≤ 0. We construct a Min memory-
less strategy that guarantees that for every initial energy and every initial budget, either the energy
level reaches 0 or it is bounded. By Lemma 16, this suffices for Min to guarantee a non-positive
mean-payoff value in G.
Constructing a memoryless strategy in strongly-connected bidding mean-payoff games is much
more challenging than strongly-connected bidding parity games. The idea behind our construction
is to tie between changes in the energy level and changes of the budget. That is, in order to decrease
the energy by one unit, Min needs to invest at most one unit of budget (with an appropriate normaliz-
ation), and when Max increases the energy by one unit, Min’s gain is at least one unit of budget. Our
solution builds on an alternative solution to the two-loop game in Figure 1. This solution is inspired
by a similar solution in [36]. Indeed, given the result in Theorem 12, one can suspect that Max can
force the game to arbitrarily high value. The idea behind our solution is to prevent such an outcome
by tying between changes in the energy level and changes of the budget.
I Example 18. Consider the bidding mean-payoff game that is depicted in Figure 1. We show a
Min strategy that guarantees a non-positive mean-payoff value. Consider an initial Min budget of
Binitm ∈ [0, 1] and an initial energy level of kI ∈ N. Let N ∈ N be such that Binitm > kN . Min bids
1
N and takes the (−1)-weighted edge upon winning. Intuitively, Min invests 1N for every decrease
of unit of energy and, since by losing a bidding he gains at least 1N , this is also the amount he gains
when the energy increases. Formally, it is not hard to show that the following invariant is maintained:
if the energy level reaches k ∈ N, Min’s budget is at least kN . Note that the invariant implies that
either an energy level of 0 is reached infinitely often, or the energy is bounded byN . Indeed, in order
to cross an energy of N , Max would need to invest a budget of more than 1. Lemma 16 implies that
the mean-payoff value is non-positive, and we are done. J
Extending this result to general strongly connected games is not immediate. Consider a strongly-
connected game G = 〈V,E,w〉 and a vertex u ∈ V . We would like to maintain the invariant that
upon reaching uwith energy k, the budget of Min exceeds k/N , for a carefully chosenN . The game
in the simple example above has two favorable properties that general SCCs do not necessarily have.
First, unlike the game in the example, there can be infinite paths that avoid u, thus Min might need
to invest budget in drawing the game back to u. Moreover, different paths from u to itself may have
different energy levels, so bidding a uniform value (like the 1N above) is not possible. The solution
to these problems is surprisingly elegant and uses the weighted Richman function in Definition 14.
Consider an initial budget of Binitm ∈ [0, 1] for Min and an initial energy kI ∈ N. We describe
Min’s strategy fm. At a vertex v ∈ V , Min’s bid is W (v
+)−W (v−)
2 · 1N and he proceeds to v− upon
winning, where we choose N ∈ N in the following. Let wM be the maximal absolute weighted
Richman value in G, thus wM = maxv∈V |W (v)|. Let bM be the maximal absolute “bid”, thus
bM = maxv∈V |W (v
+)−W (v−)
2 |. We choose N ∈ N such that Binitm > kI+bM+wMN .
In the following lemmas we prove that fm guarantees that an outcome either reaches energy
level 0 or that the energy is bounded, as well as showing that fm is legal, i.e., that Min always bids
less than his budget. The following lemma is the crux of the construction as it connects the weighted
Richman function with the change in energy and in budget. Recall that for a finite outcome pi the
accumulated energy in pi is E(pi) and the payments of Min throughout pi is Bm(pi).
I Lemma 19. Consider a Max strategy fM , and let pi = out(fm, fM ) be a finite outcome that
starts in a vertex v and ends in v′. Then, we have W (v)−W (v′) ≥ E(pi) +N · Bm(pi).
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Proof. We prove by induction on the length of pi. In the base case v = v′, thus E(pi) = Bm(pi) = 0
and the claim is trivial. For the induction step, let b be the winning bid in the first round and
let pi′ be the suffix of pi after the first bidding. We distinguish between two cases. In the first
case, Min wins the bidding, pays b = W (v
+)−W (v−)
2 · 1N , and proceeds to v−. Thus, we have
E(pi) + N · Bm(pi) = w(v) + E(pi′) + N
(
b + Bm(pi′)
)
. By the induction hypothesis, we have
E(pi′) + N · Bm(pi′) ≤ W (v−) −W (v′), thus E(pi) + N · Bm(pi) ≤ w(v) + W (v
+)−W (v−)
2 +
W (v−) −W (v′) = W (v) −W (v′), and we are done. For the second case, suppose Max wins the
bidding. Min’s gain is−b < −W (v+)−W (v−)2 · 1N , and Max proceeds to v′′ havingW (v′′) ≤W (v+).
Similar to the previous case, we have E(pi) +N · Bm(pi) = w(v) +E(pi′) +N
(− b+Bm(pi′)) ≤
w(v)− W (v−)−W (v+)2 +W (v+)−W (v′) =W (v)−W (v′), and we are done. J
The following corollary of Lemma 19 explains why we refer to our technique as “tying energy
and budget”. Its proof follows from the fact that W (us) ≤ 0 and W (ut) = 0.
I Corollary 20. Consider a Max strategy fM , and let pi = out(fm, fM ) be a finite outcome from
u to u. Then, we have −N · Bm(pi) ≤ E(pi).
We formalize the intuition above by means of an invariant that is maintained throughout the
outcome. Recall that the game starts from a vertex u ∈ V with W (u) ≤ 0, the initial energy is
kI ∈ N, Min’s initial budget is Binitm ∈ [0, 1], and N is such that Binitm > kI+bM+wMN .
I Lemma 21. Consider a Max strategy fM , and let pi = out(fm, fM ) be a finite outcome. Then,
when the energy level reaches k, Min’s budget is at least k+bMN .
Proof. The invariant clearly holds initially. Consider a partition pi = pi1 ·pi2, where pi1 is a maximal
prefix of pi that ends in u and pi2 starts in u and ends in a vertex v ∈ V . The energy level at the end
of pi is k = kI +E(pi). Recall that Bm(pi) is the sum of Min’s payments in pi, thus his budget at the
end of pi is Binitm −
(Bm(pi1) + Bm(pi2)). By Corollary 20, we have −Bm(pi1) ≥ 1NE(pi1) and by
Lemma 19, we have−Bm(pi2) ≥ 1N
(
E(pi2)−W (u)+W (v)
) ≥ 1N (E(pi2)−0−wM). Combining
withBinitm ≥ kI+bM+wMN , we have that the new budget is at least kI+bM+wMN +E(pi1)N +E(pi2)−wMN =
k+bM
N , and we are done. J
Lemma 21 implies that Min always has sufficient budget to bid according to fm, thus the strategy is
legal. Moreover, since Min’s budget cannot exceed 1, Lemma 21 implies that if the energy does not
reach 0, then it is bounded byN−bM . Thus, Lemma 16 implies that Min has a memoryless strategy
that guarantees a non-positive mean-payoff value in a strongly-connected bidding mean-payoff game
having a vertex u with W (u) ≤ 0. Combining with the memoryless strategy in parity games, we
have the following.
I Theorem 22. Consider a bidding mean-payoff game G = 〈V,E,w〉 and a vertex v ∈ V .
If Min’s initial budget exceeds THRESH(v), he has a memoryless strategy that guarantees a non-
positive mean-payoff value.
4.3 A Memoryless Optimal Strategy for Max
The complementary result of the previous section is more involved. Consider a strongly-connected
bidding mean-payoff game G with a vertex u that has W (u) > 0. We devise a Max strategy that
guarantees a positive mean-payoff value in G. We start with a fragment of the general case called
recurrent SCCs, and we generalize our solution later. We say that an SCC G = 〈V,E〉 is a recurrent,
if there is a vertex u ∈ V such that every cycle in G includes u. We refer to u as the root of G.
XX:16 Infinite-Duration Bidding Games
Intuitively, the construction has two ingredients. First, we develop the idea of tying energy and
budget. We construct a Max strategy fM that guarantees the following: when Max invests a unit
of budget (with an appropriate normalization), then the energy increases by at least one unit, and
when the energy decreases by one unit, Max’s gain is at least z > 1 units of budget, where z arises
from the game graph. The second ingredient concerns the normalization factor. Recall that in the
previous section it was a constant 1N . Here on the other hand, it cannot be constant. Indeed, if
the normalization does not decrease as the energy increases, Max’s budget will eventually run out,
which is problematic since with a budget of 1, Min can guarantee reaching energy level 0, no matter
how high the energy is. The challenge is to decide when and how to decrease the normalization
factor. We split N into energy blocks of size M , for a carefully chosen M ∈ N. The normalization
factor of the bids depends on the block in which the energy is in, and we refer to it as the currency
of the block. The currency of the n-th block is z−n. Note that the currency of the (n−1)-th block is
higher by a factor of z from the currency of the n-th block. This is where the first ingredient comes
in: investing in the n-th block is done in the currency of the n-th block, whereas gaining in the n-th
block is in the higher currency of the (n− 1)-th block. We switch between the currencies when the
energy moves between energy blocks only at the root u of G. This is possible since G is a recurrent
SCC. The mismatch between gaining and investing is handy when switching between currencies as
we cannot guarantee that when we reach u the energy is exactly in the boundary of an energy block.
We formalize this intuition. We start by finding an alternative definition for the weighted Rich-
man function. Recall that in order to define W , we constructed a new graph Gu by splitting u into
us and ut. We define the contribution of a vertex v ∈ V to W (us), denoted cont(v), as follows. We
have cont(us) = 1. For a vertex v ∈ V , we define pre(v) = {v′ ∈ V : v = v′− or v = v′+}. For
v ∈ V , we define cont(v) =∑v′∈pre(v) 12 · cont(v′).
I Lemma 23. Consider a strongly-connected mean-payoff game G = 〈V,E,w〉, which is not
necessarily recurrent. We have W (u) =
∑
v∈V
(
cont(v) · w(v)).
Proof. The proof uses the connection with probabilistic models, and follows from standard argu-
ments there. Let M be a rewarded Markov chain on the structure of G, where edges of the form
〈v, v+〉 and 〈v, v−〉 have probability 1/2 each and all other edges have probability 0. As observed
above, W (u) coincides with the expected reward of a path from u to itself inM, which by standard
probabilistic arguments, coincides with the long-run average reward in M. In turn, the long-run
average reward equals
∑
v∈V µ(v) · w(v), where µ(v) is the invariant distribution of v, which is
exactly cont(v) in G. Thus, the claim follows. J
Let z =
(∑
v:w(v)≥0 cont(v) · w(v)
) · (∑v:w(v)<0 cont(v) · |w(v)|)−1. Since W (u) > 0,
we have z > 1. Let Gz be the game that is obtained from G by multiplying the negative-weighted
vertices by z, thus Gz = 〈V,E,wz〉, where wz(v) = w(v) if w(v) ≥ 0 and otherwise wz(v) =
z · w(v). We denote by W z the weighted threshold budgets in Gz . The following lemma follows
immediately from Lemma 23.
I Lemma 24. We have W z(u) = 0.
We define the partition into energy blocks. Let cycles(u) be the set of simple cycles from u to
itself and wM = maxpi∈cycles(u) |E(pi)|. We choose M such that M ≥ (bM + 3wM )/(1 − z−1),
where bM is the maximal bid as in the previous section. We partition N into blocks of size M . For
n ≥ 1, we refer to the n-th block asMn, and we haveMn = {M(n−1),M(n−1)+1, . . . ,Mn−1}.
We use β↓n and β
↑
n to mark the upper and lower boundaries of Mn, respectively. We use a M≥n to
denote the set {Mn,Mn+1, . . .}. Consider a finite outcome pi that ends in u and let visitu(pi) be
the set of indices in which pi visits u. Let kI ∈ N be an initial energy. We say that pi visits Mn
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if kI + E(pi) ∈ Mn. We say that pi stays in Mn starting from an index 1 ≤ i ≤ |pi| if for all
j ∈ visitu(pi) such that j ≥ i, we have kI + E(pi1, . . . , pij) ∈Mn.
We are ready to describe Max’s strategy fM . Suppose the game reaches a vertex v and the
energy in the last visit to u was in Mn, for n ≥ 1. Then, Max bids z−n · 12
(
W z(v+) −W z(v−))
and proceeds to v+ upon winning. Note that currency changes occur only in u. Recall that for an
outcome pi, the sum of payments of Max is BM (pi) and let Ez(pi) be the change in energy in Gz .
The proof of Lemma 19 can easily be adjusted to this setting.
I Lemma 25. Consider a Min strategy fm, and let pi = out(fm, fM ) be a finite outcome that
starts in v, ends in v′, and stays within a block Mn, for n ≥ 1. We have W z(v) − W z(v′) ≤
Ez(pi)− zn · BM (pi). In particular, for pi ∈ cycles(u), we have Ez(pi) ≤ zn · BM (pi).
We relate between the changes in energy in the two structures.
I Lemma 26. Consider an outcome pi ∈ cycles(u). Then, E(pi) ≥ Ez(pi) and E(pi) ≥ zEz(pi).
Proof. Let E≥0(pi) and E<0(pi) be the sum of non-negative weights and negative weights in pi,
respectively. We haveE(pi) = E≥0(pi)+E<0(pi) andEz(pi) = E≥0(pi)+zE<0(pi). The inequality
E(pi) ≥ Ez(pi) is immediate. For the second inequality, we multiply the first equality by z and
subtract it from the first to get Ez(pi)− zE(pi) = E≥0(pi)− zE≥0(pi) ≤ 0, and we are done. J
A corollary of Lemmas 25 and 26 is the following. Recall that BM (pi) is the amount that Max
pays, thus it is negative when Max gains budget. Intuitively, the corollary states that if the energy
increases in Mn, then Max invests in the currency of Mn, and if the energy decreases, he gains in
the currency of Mn−1.
I Corollary 27. Consider a Min strategy fm, and let pi = out(fm, fM ) be a finite outcome such
that pi ∈ cycles(u). Then, we have E(pi) ≥ zn · BM (pi) and zE(pi) ≥ zn · BM (pi).
Consider an initial Max budget BinitM ∈ [0, 1]. We choose an initial energy kI ∈ N with which
fM guarantees that energy level 0 is never reached. Recall the intuition that increasing the energy by
a unit requires an investment of a unit of budget in the right currency. Thus, increasing the energy
from the lower boundary β↓n of Mn to its upper boundary β
↑
n costs M · z−n. We use cost(Mn) to
refer to M · z−n and cost(M≥n) =
∑∞
i=n cost(Mn). A first guess for kI would be β↓n such that
BinitM > cost(M≥n). This is almost correct. We need some wiggle room to allow for changes in
the currency. Let wiggle = 2wM + bM , where recall that wM = maxpi∈cycles(u)E(pi) and that bM
is the maximal bid. We define kI to be β↓n such that B
init
M > wiggle · z−(n−1) + cost(M≥n) and∑n
i=1 cost(Mi) > 1, thus Min would need to invest a budget of more than 1 in order to drop the
energy to 0.
Consider a Min strategy fm, and let pi = out(fm, fM ) be a finite outcome. We partition pi into
subsequences in which the same currency is used. Let pi = pi1 · pi2 · . . . · pi` be a partition of pi. For
1 ≤ i ≤ `, we use pii to refer to the prefix pi1 · . . . · pii of pi, and we use ei = kI + E(pii) to refer to
the energy at the end of pii. Consider the partition in which, for 1 ≤ i ≤ `, the prefix pii visits u and
pii is a maximal subsequence that stays in some energy block.
Suppose pii stays in Mn. There can be two options; either the energy decreases in pii, thus the
energy before it ei−1 is inMn+1 and the energy after it ei is inMn, or it increases, thus ei−1 ∈Mn−1
and ei ∈ Mn. We then call pii decreasing and increasing, respectively. The definition of wM and
the fact that G is recurrent imply that upon entering Mn, the energy is within wM of the boundary.
Thus, in the case that pii is decreasing, the energy at the end of pii is ei ≥ β↑n − wM and in the case
it is increasing, we have ei ≤ β↓n + wM . Let `0 = 0, and for i ≥ 1, let `i = (β↓n+1 − wM ) − ei in
the first case and `i = (β↓n +wM )− ei in the second case. Note that `i ∈ {0, . . . , 2wM}. We prove
the following invariant on Max’s budget when changing between energy blocks.
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Figure 2 An illustration of the different cases of changing currency. Dark lines mark the boundary of an
energy block and dotted lines mark a region of size wM around the boundary.
I Lemma 28. For every i ≥ 0, suppose pii ends in Mn. The budget of Max at the end of outcome
pii is at least (wiggle+ `i) · z−(nˆ−1)+ cost(M≥nˆ), where nˆ = n+1 if pii is decreasing and nˆ = n
if pii is increasing.
Proof. The proof is by induction. The base case follows from our choice of initial energy. For
i ≥ 1, assume the claim holds for pii−1 and we prove for pii. There are four cases depending on the
energy level ei−1 at the end of pii−1 (see Figure 2). Intuitively, Case 1 is the simplest and follows
from the fact that increasing one of energy in Mn requires an investment of z−n, thus the total
investment is roughly Mz−n. In cases 3 and 4 Max invests and gains in the “wrong” currency. For
example, in Case 3, since the energy starts in Mn+1, the bids are in the lower currency, so he gains
for some of the energy units in Mn in the currency of Mn+1. Here, the mismatch between gaining
and investing comes into play. Finally, in Case 2, the energy decreases by at least M − wM and the
gain is in the currency z−(n−1). We choose M such that the gain “covers” the cost of Mn, i.e., it is
at least Mz−n, and even has a surplus that covers the wiggle room needed at the bottom of Mn.
Consider Cases 1, 3, and 4 in the figure, thus when ei−1 ∈Mn+1 near β↓n+1, thus pii is decreas-
ing, or when ei−1 ∈ Mn−1, thus pii is increasing. We prove the first of these case and the others
are similar. Suppose ei−1 ∈ Mn+1, thus pii decreases into Mn and ei is near β↑n. Thus, we have
`i−1 = (β↓n+1 + wM ) − ei−1 and `i = (β↓n+1 + wM ) − ei. since we decrease in blocks, we have
`i−1 < `i and E(pii) = `i−1 − `i. By Corollary 27, we have zn+1 · BM (pii) ≥ z · (`i−1 − `i),
thus the gain in budget in pii is at least (`i − `i−1)z−n. The induction hypothesis states that Max’s
budget in pii−1 is at least (wM + bM + `i−1) ·z−n+
∑∞
j=nMz
−j , thus his budget after pii is at least
(wM+bM+`i)·z−n+
∑∞
j=nMz
−j , and we are done. The final case, which is similar to Case 2 in the
figure with a slight difference; the figure depicts energy that crosses Mn and we prove for a energy
that crosses Mn+1 and ends in Mn. That is, the energy at pii−1 is in Mn+1 and ei−1 ≥ β↑n+1 −wM
and ei ≤ β↓n+1 = β↑n. The decrease in energy is E(pii) = (2wM −`i−1)+(M −2wM )+`i, thus by
Corollary 27, the increase in budget isE(pii) ·zn−1. We choseM such that (M−2wM ) ·z−(n−1) ≥
(wM + bM ) · z−(n−1)+M · z−n. The claim follows from combining with the induction hypothesis,
and we are done. J
It is not hard to show that Lemma 28 implies that fM is legal. That is, consider a finite outcome
pi that starts immediately after a change in currency. Using Lemma 25, we can prove by induction on
the length of pi that Max has sufficient budget for bidding. The harder case is when pi decreases, and
the proof follows from the fact that wiggle is in the higher currency of the lower block. Combining
Lemma 28 with our choice of the initial energy, we get that the energy never reaches 0 as otherwise
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Min invests a budget of more than 1. Lemma 16 implies that Max guarantees a positive mean-payoff
value in a strongly-connected game.
4.4 An optimal Max strategy in general games
In this section we develop a constant-memory strategy for Max that guarantees a positive mean-
payoff value. The difficulty lies in coping with outcomes in which the energy forms a sine-like wave
on the boundary of an energy block. In recurrent SCCs, we can change currency every time the
wave changes block, which does not work in general strongly-connected games as we show in the
following example.
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Figure 3 An example showing that the Max strategy developed in the previous section fails in general
strongly-connected games. In a vertex v with negative weight, the weight w(v) of v is depicted on top and
wz(v) on the bottom. Defining z as in the previous section, we have z = 2.
I Example 29. Consider the strongly-connected mean-payoff game G that is depicted in Figure 3.
Note that there can be an infinite outcome that stays in v1. Moreover note that since v+1 = v1,
upon winning a bidding in v1, Max stays in v1. Thus, currency changes must occur in v1 as other-
wise Max’s budget will eventually run out. The strategy in the previous section changes currency
whenever the energy changes blocks. We show that naively changing currency in v1 whenever a
change in energy block occurs, is also not possible. Note that in this game, using the definition of
the previous section, we have z = 2. Suppose the game starts in u in the third energy block, thus
the normalization factor is 1/8. Consider the outcome in which Max wins with bz = 3/8 in u and
moves to v1, wins again with bz = 1/2 · 1/8 and stays in v1, and then loses twice, thus the gain is at
least 1/8(1/2 + 4) and the game returns to u. The change in energy is 0.5 + 0.5 + −1 = 0. Now,
suppose the energy at u is at the top of the third block. So, after visiting v1 twice, the energy moves
to the fourth block and the currency changes to 1/16. Thus, Max pays the first two wins in the high
currency: 3 · 1/8+ 0.5 · 1/8 and gains in the low currency: −0.5 · 1/16− 4 · 1/16. All in all, Max’s
payments are positive, thus his budget decreases, while the energy level stays the same. Min can
perform bids so that this outcome repeats, thus eventually exhausting Max’s budget.
We develop further the two ingredients that are used in the previous section. First, recall that
investing in an energy block Mn is in the currency of the n-th block, whereas gaining is in the
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higher currency of the (n − 1)-th block. In general games, we need a stronger property; investing
in Mn is in the lower currency of the (n + 1)-th block while gaining is still in the higher currency
of the (n− 1)-th block. Next, we differentiate between even blocks, i.e., M2n, and odd blocks, i.e.,
M2n+1, for some n ∈ N. When the energy level reaches an even block M2n, the currency used
is z−n. In order to determine the currency in the odd blocks, we take the history of the play into
account; the currency matches the currency in the last energy block that was visited before entering
M2n+1. Hence, we call our strategy a constant-memory strategy. The odd blocks serve as “buffers”
so that when we change currency, there is a sufficiently large change in energy that in turn implies
that Max’s budget sufficiently increases compared with the change in energy. Combining with the
memoryless strategy in parity games of Theorem 10, we have the following.
We formalize this intuition. Consider a strongly-connected mean-payoff bidding games G =
〈V,E,w〉 having a vertex u ∈ V with W (u) > 0. Recall that W (u) = ∑v∈V cont(v) · w(v). Let
pos =
∑
v:w(v)>0 cont(v) · w(v) and neg =
∑
v:w(v)<0 cont(v) · |w(v)|. We define z =
√
pos
neg .
Since W (u) > 0, we have z > 1. We define a new weight function w˜z : V → IR as follows
w˜z(v) =
{
w(v) · z if w(v) < 0
w(v) · 1z if w(v) ≥ 0
Let G˜z = 〈V,E, w˜z〉 and W˜ z be the weighted-Richman values in G˜z . For a finite outcome pi,
let E˜z be the sum of weights that pi traverses in G˜z . The first part of following lemma is immediate
from the definition of G˜z and the second is proven similarly to Lemma 26.
I Lemma 30. The following two properties hold.
W˜ z(u) = 0.
Consider a path pi. We have E˜z(pi) ≤ z · E(pi) and E˜z(pi) ≤ 1z · E(pi).
We construct a Max strategy fM that uses constant memory. When reaching a vertex v ∈ V ,
Max bids 12
(
W˜ z(v+) − W˜ z(v−)) · γ and moves to v+ upon winning, where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the
normalization factor, which recall that we refer to as the currency. Unlike the previous section in
which the currency changes occur only in the root, here, changes can occur anywhere. In order to
choose the currency, similarly to the previous section, we partitionN into blocks of M˜ ∈ N, where
we choose M˜ later on. We refer to the n-th block as M˜n = {M˜ · (n − 1), . . . , M˜n − 1}. We
distinguish between even blocks, namely M˜2n, and odd blocks, namely M˜2n+1, for n ∈ N. When
the energy level reaches an even block M˜2n, the currency is z−n. In order to determine the currency
in the odd blocks, we take the history of the play into account; the currency matches the currency in
the last energy block that was visited before entering M˜2n+1. Thus, if it is M˜2n, then the currency
is z−n and otherwise, it is the energy block M˜2n+2, and the currency is z−(n+1). We say that a
finite outcome is γ-consistent when all the bids Max performs in it are made in the same currency
γ. Lemma 25 clearly follows to γ-consistent outcomes. Let wM = maxv∈V |W (v)|. The following
lemma follows from combining Lemma 25 with Lemma 30.
I Lemma 31. Consider a (z−n)-consistent outcome pi that starts in v and ends in v′. We have
−BM (pi) ≥ −E(pi) · z−(n−1) − 2wM · z−n and BM (pi) ≤ E(pi) · z−(n+1) + 2wM · z−n.
Suppose Max is playing according to fM and Min is playing according to some strategy fm. Let
pi = out(fm, fM ) be the infinite outcome. Let pi = pi1 ·pi2 · . . . be a partition of pi into maximal finite
outcomes that have a consistent currency. As in the previous section, for i ≥ 1, let `i ∈ N be the
energy at the end of pii, thus `i = kI + E(pi1 . . . pii), where kI is an initial energy. Also, let β↑n and
β↓n be respectively, the upper and lower boundaries of the energy block Mn. Note that β
↑
n = β
↓
n+1.
Suppose a subpath pii starts in a vertex v and ends in v′. We make observations on the budget
change during pii. There are four cases, which are depicted in Figure 4. Note that the currency in
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Figure 4 The four cases of pii in the general setting.
Cases 1 and 3 is z−n and in Cases 2 and 4 it is z−(n+1). The energy change in pii in Cases 1 and 2
is at least 2M and at most 2M + 2wM and in Cases 3 and 4 it is at least M and at most M + 2wM .
We use Lemma 31 to obtain the following:
I Lemma 32. The following bounds hold for the change in budget in the four cases depicted in
Figure 4.
1. BM (pii) ≤ (2M˜ + 2wM ) · z−(n+1) + 2wM · z−n,
2. −BM (pii) ≥ 2M˜ · z−n − 2wM · z−(n+1),
3. BM (pii) ≤ (M˜ + 2wM ) · z−(n+1) + 2wM · z−n, and
4. −BM (pii) ≥ M˜ · z−n + 2wM · z−(n+1).
To conclude the construction, given an initial Max budget, we find an initial energy level kI
with which Max can guarantee winning. We do this by finding an invariant on his budget at the
end points of energy blocks. Recall the intuition that increasing the energy within an energy block
costs one unit of budget in the currency of the block. Thus, similarly to the previous section, the
cost of energy block M˜2n, for n ∈ IN, is M˜ · z−n. The difficulty is in charging M˜2n+1 since the
currency depends on whether the energy increases or decreases. We show that charging with the
higher currency works, thus the cost of M˜2n+1 is also M˜ · z−n.
Recall from the previous section that Max’s budget at the bottom of an energy block M˜2n, needs
to include, in addition to the costs of the energy blocks M˜≥2n, wiggle room in the currency of the
lower block. Going back to the Lemma 32, we observe that Case 4 is the only problematic case.
Indeed, in all other cases, the path pii crosses an energy block whose cost is given in a currency
that is lower than the currency of gaining (when decreasing), or higher than the currency of investing
(when increasing). Take for example Case 2. It crosses both M˜2n+2 and M˜2n+1. The cost of M˜2n+2
is M˜ · z−(n+1) whereas the gain for it is roughly M˜ · z−n. The situation in Case 4 is not that bad.
The gain equals the cost of M˜2n+1, i.e., M˜ · z−n, up to a constant, i.e., 2wM · z−n. We add this
constant in the invariant, thus we require Max’s budget at β↑2n+1 to include the costs of the higher
blocks, the wiggle room, and a surplus of 2wM · z−n.
We define the invariant on Max’s budget formally. Recall that wiggle = 2wM + bM , where bM
is the maximal bid, and it is used to guarantee that fM is legal in an outcome that stays in an energy
block. We write Inv(β↑` ) to refer to the budget that Max has when the currency changes near β
↑
` ,
thus within |wM | of β↑` . We have the following.
Inv(β↑2n) = wiggle · z−n + z−nM˜ +
∑∞
i=n+1 2z−iM˜ , and
Inv(β↑2n+1) = wiggle · z−n + 2wM · z−(n+1) +
∑∞
i=n+1 2z−iM˜ .
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To conclude the construction, we choose M˜ to be large enough so that the invariant is maintained
assuming it is maintained initially. Also, given an initial budget for Max, we choose an initial energy
level such that the invariant is initially maintained. We thus have the following.
I Theorem 33. Consider a bidding mean-payoff game G = 〈V,E,w〉. For a vertex v ∈ V , if Max
has an initial budget that is greater than 1 − THRESH(v), he has a constant-memoryless strategy
that guarantees a positive mean-payoff value.
5 Discussion and Future Directions
We introduce and study infinite-duration bidding games in which the players bid for the right to move
the token. This work belongs to a line of works that transfer concepts and ideas between the areas of
formal methods and algorithmic game theory (AGT, for short). A core field of AGT is the study of
auctions, and the bidding in a bidding game can be seen as a simple auction for determining which
player moves. Richman games originated in the game theory community in the 90s and recently
gained interest by the AGT community [30]. We combine them with the study of infinite-duration
games, which is well-studied in the formal methods community. Prior to this work, a series of
works focused on applying concepts and ideas from formal methods to resource-allocation games
[10, 8, 9, 6, 7, 35], which constitutes a well-studied class of games in AGT. More to the formal
methods side, there are many works on games that share similar concepts to these that are studied in
AGT. For example, logics for reasoning about multi-agent systems [3, 19, 40], studies of equilibria
in games related to synthesis and repair problems [18, 25, 1, 15], and studies of infinite-duration
non-zero-sum games [21, 16, 17, 12].
There are several problems we left open as well as plenty of future research directions. We list
a handful of them below. We showed that the complexity of THRESH-BUDG is in NP and coNP.
We leave open the problem of determining its exact complexity. We conjecture that it is reducible
from solving simple stochastic games, which will show that it is as hard as several other problems
whose exact complexity is unknown. In this work we focused on parity and mean-payoff games.
Energy games are games that are played on a weighted graph, where one of the players tries to reach
negative energy and the second player tries to prevent it. Note that unlike parity and mean-payoff,
the energy objective is not prefix independent. We can show that threshold budgets exist in energy
games. The complexity of THRESH-BUDG in energy games is interesting and is tied with recent
work on optimizing the probability of reaching a destination in a weighted MDP [26, 42]. For acyclic
energy bidding games, the problem is PP-hard using a result in [26], and for a single-vertex games
the problem is in P using the direct formula of [32]. For general games the problem is open.
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